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The Role of the Venture Capital Company in Innovation
Leslie Barton*

Both business and government rely on innovation to a great degree to
maintain the competitiveness of their products, processes and services.
However, established organizations, by their very design, must be highly
selective in their support of innovation. Thus, even the most meritorious
innovation may fail to obtain support if the context of its origin is inappropriate, or if its predicted results are based more on vision than fact.
The corporation, for example, may find itself unable to exploit and
support a proposed innovation for internally consistent reasons. In contrast, the investment decision process of a financial institution hinges on
the opportunities presented by the innovation rather than the innovation
itself.
The venture capital industry has evolved to provide a support base
for innovation that is relatively free of the impediments of the other two
potential supporters. This discussion will explore the contrasting universes of these three sources of support: venture capital firms, corporations and financial institutions. I will also give you some observations on
the care and feeding of innovators, as they are a breed unto themselves
and require the kind of treatment that is often not available outside a
venture capital setting. In conclusion, I will summarize how venture
capitalists manage the innovator and the innovation process.
First, I would like to define innovation. Innovation involves introducing something new. For example, OPEC was an innovation. The
Sony Walkman was an innovation. Apparently the marketing department of Sony did not believe that there was a market for the product, but
the chairman of Sony was the Walkman's champion; he insisted that the
product be developed and marketed. Its success exceeded his wildest expectations by 300% in its first year on the market.
In any event, change brings benefits in some places, but often at the
expense of benefits elsewhere. That is the risk that the innovator wants
to take, if he or she perceives it as a risk at all. In the corporate world,
change equals risk, and risk perturbs a corporation's established business
directions. An established company has products and services accepted
by its customers and these customers may not be ready to accept changes
to an existing product. Similarly, a new product may require new customers, or at least a change in marketing strategy.
The corporation is a big ship with the attendant inertia of status
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quo. An innovation must be lucky to be embraced by a corporation.
Once a development program for a new product is under way, it is extremely difficult to deviate from the program. The marketing programs
and product definitions will have been set and much investment will have
been made in those areas. In summary, the history of prior decisions and
investments that have been made in the status quo could cause an innovation to be rejected because the value of an innovation is seen in relation
to the larger corporate agenda.
Every innovation needs a champion to carry it through from inception to fruition. Corporate managers with the necessary talent to do this
tend to move on, up, or out of their positions too early in the process to
be effective champions. The durability and stability of the commitment
to the innovation depends on the champion. He may not be there long
enough to follow through. Consequently, unless the corporation can immediately draw out benefits from the implementation of the innovation,
there is a low probability that an innovation will be accepted.
While a corporation may have too much of its own history, a potential institutional supporter may not see enough history. Necessarily, financial institutions rely on track records, histories of industries, products
and companies in order to assess the risk before making an investment.
So they are later-stage supporters of innovation. They do not enter at the
inception stage.
Institutions do not have the operational infrastructure to manage
the innovative process. In order to help an innovation to fruition an assessment of the people, technology and market as the visionary sees them
developing is required. Institutions do not deal at that level. So there is
a low probability of support from a financial institution.
Venture capitalists, on the other hand, thrive on innovation. Venture capitalists are small multi-businessmen. Each opportunity can be
evaluated "objectively," because the venture capitalist is outside of the
context of a large corporate agenda and has fewer variables to worry
about. The two key variables for a venture capitalist are the people who
want to implement the vision and the market at which they want to direct the vision. Venture capital companies are organized and staffed to
assess and manage risk. They have the people in place, the time available
to the people in place and the structure to go through a microassessment. Also, venture capitalists have long time horizons and are
organized to manage and contain failure on a small scale.
Some characteristics of attractive innovation opportunities are generally in the niche market area. Venture capitalists have great appetites
for niche markets, where small gets big, and where timing of entry is the
key to success. An example of bad timing is the "smart cards," plastic
credit cards embedded with microcircuitry containing your entire medical, banking, or financial history. The technology and means of production have been around for years, but there are immense institutional
impediments. An example of a good idea is a spreadsheet program such
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as Lotus 1-2-3, which made it easier to operate a personal computer than
in the past. As a result, venture capitalists now see exquisitely detailed
business plans that are inaccurate to at least three decimal places.
A niche market, of course, must have some kind of defensible or
proprietary attribute, whether it be in its technology, its products or its
services. The defensibility can come from patents or know-how. The
defensibility can come from speed of implementation of a perceived market opportunity. The technology may not be particularly new and the
idea may be a very simple one, you just get it to market very quickly. I
think the Sony Walkman would fall in that class.
Venture capitalists obviously have to look for high value-added
products or services to fund the kind of growth that one looks for in a
venture capital situation. Whatever it is, it has to provide quantum benefits and solve very big problems. We might be in the business of cultivating asparagus, but we are not in the business of growing oak trees.
On the other hand, niche markets are small, and in a corporate setting, because of the way corporations are organized, the same senior
management team rules on billion dollar decisions as on million dollar
decisions. That really slows the decision process. Evaluated in the context of the business thrust, niche opportunities are generally too small to
help a large company grow 10% or 25% per annum, whatever its objectives. Corporations tend to look for home runs, the $100 million plus
business. There aren't many of those around; it might be wise for corporations to look at other opportunities and find ways to take advantage of
them.
The established corporation is generally motivated to increase market share for existing products. So an innovation is very often valued in
terms of what it can do for the market share of these products. I have
seen many innovations that stall because they could not bring any help to
major product lines.
Corporations may prefer to acquire the results of innovation and
pay a lot of money, rather than step up to creation of the business entity
that results. So early support from inception goes through a very tough
selection process in the corporate setting. As management generally
sticks to its proven products, this can and does generate a lot of opportunities for venture capital to support innovation.
Institutions deal on an entirely different level with innovation.
They are neither equipped with the historical knowledge required, nor
the infrastructure to manage, and generally are focused on very large
dollar opportunities. They have large amounts of funds to place, and a
$1 million or $10 million investment is not a significant opportunity. On
the other hand, most institutional investors will invest in venture capital
limited partnerships to access such opportunities, and to gain an insight
into what is coming. So corporations and institutions have difficulty with
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niche opportunities of innovation. Venture capital has a durable agenda,
while institutions may be too distant to provide support.
Another way of looking at innovations as opportunities is to compare the focus of the three potential supporters. Venture capitalists can
rarely say we are not in that business, as a corporation often must say.
We have to be broadly interested and have enough knowledge about any
industry in the high-technology field to sort out the scams and the
schemes from the visions, and we cannot afford to be too selective. Our
interest is the same as most other technology-oriented capital funds. We
span all kinds of telecommunications, computer systems and peripherals,
manufacturing processes and services. These may include voice, data or
video communications, new materials, intelligent databases, marketing
information or intelligence gathering, and management services. Our focus is very general - whatever looks potentially profitable. So we cannot say we are not in a particular business.
An institution may say we will not enter that business yet. The corporation may say we do not choose to enter that business at all. But even
the largest corporations have some high degree of focus. I was with IBM
in the United Kingdom in the early 1970s, and I collaborated with two
very brilliant designers who went on to develop what would now be
called the personal computer. It was a crude but remarkable achievement. The project was taken all the way up to the president of IBM and
after much deliberation the corporation rejected the opportunity on the
grounds that IBM could not provide field support for 20 million or 30
million personal computers. Whether they were right or wrong, they
sure changed their minds when somebody else did it.
Institutions have broad interests, but prefer established opportunities. Corporations provided necessarily self-serving support to innovation on a highly selective basis. Institutions prefer to wait for innovation
to become significant enough for them to provide larger dollars, whereas
venture capitalists have a desperate need for innovation in which to
invest.
The human capital available today is extraordinarily well-equipped.
It is in the best shape ever. Anybody who goes through graduate school
today is extremely computer literate. The better ones are extremely technology literate; they know what is going on under the covers of the tools
that they use. We are finding people who have crossed over from one
discipline by mapping the technology they use while they were learning
that discipline onto an application that really is very innovative. For
example, two weeks ago, we invested in a small Canadian corporation.
The CEO is a prizewinning neurosurgeon. During his research, he became very familiar with personal computers and the ability of technology
to help him treat his patients better. Now he is managing a company
which provides the world's best 3-D imaging from 2-D CAT scan data.
Moreover, he knows the market. He used to be in it, so he knows the
problems. He has product ideas for the next five years. He is a prime
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example of someone from one discipline using another discipline to create a whole new product class. We see more of those as the years pass.
Innovators are certainly risk-oriented mavericks. They demonstrate
unreasonable conviction based on insufficient evidence, and are generally
difficult to deal with, often bordering on the irrational. In such cases,
venture capitalists' support is often the only means by which they can get
their innovations even assessed. There is $3 billion in the venture capital
industry this year for such support to be provided.
The corporation is clearly going to have difficulty with mavericks.
The potential contribution of a maverick is evaluated in the context of
the ever present larger corporate agenda. A brilliant person may be required or asked to do something perceived as more relevant to the corporation, but these mavericks will not be diverted. They will not go to a
position which is deemed to be more worthwhile than the course on
which they are set. Therefore, they are often deemed to be unmanageable and they leave. Then there are plenty of people like me who will
listen to what they want to do and provide support.
Innovators have to be managed and supported in a particular way.
A key skill of the venture capitalists in the industry as a whole, is the
ability to be able to harness the innovator. By being a hands-on investor,
one lives with the innovator. You spend 10-15% of your time with him
and really get under his skin. You develop congruent motivations. Innovators are smart people, they know when you are with them. You have
to be able to share the vision and accept the risk in order to become part
of the team.
The fact that innovators are mavericks and that people tend to recruit in their own image can leave you a disastrous situation. A room
full of innovators is a horrible sight. So a wise venture capitalist will go
through a process of "founderproofing" the business, by helping in the
recruiting process and building the team.
Also, no matter how much of the company the innovator retains
ownership of, there is a golden rule in venture capital which says that he
who has the gold rules. If the innovator does not have any money and I
only own 1%, but I have the money, then he had better listen to what I
have to tell him.
In practical terms, what kind of support does real working management by the venture capitalist provide in the early stages of an innovative
company? The company doesn't need a chief financial officer, so one of
the venture capitalists could take that role. The company does not need
a high power marketing type, but there should be somebody in the venture group who can bring that kind of expertise and vision. The same is
true for manufacturing.
A more fundamental piece of wisdom that venture capitalists bring
to a project is the prior experience of a high-growth situation which has
unique problems and opportunities. For a number of years, I was with a
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company that doubled in size for seven straight years. It is not too difficult to grow from 100 employees to 200, but when you go from 4000 to
8000, it is tough. Half of your employees have been with you less than a
year and you don't have room for all of them. It is that kind of practical
detail that can confound an innovator in the implementation of his
vision.
The refinement of strategic directions is very important. In my experience, the first few days of discussion about new products or services
involving any kind of technology will define almost the entire strategy,
everything needed to achieve the end result. It defines the cost to design
the product, the cost of production, the quality, the customer base and
the manufacturing requirements. Those first few crucial days cost very
little, but during the first few thousand dollars of actual money spent,
you will find you have committed at least 90% of your total outlay. It is
the most critical time in the entire innovation process.
A good venture capitalist will have many, many external contacts
and networks, and these are always useful to an entrepreneur or innovator. These include access to customers' complementary technologies and
so on. We become strongly identified with the ventures - setting goals
and having an interest in the investment helps.
Investments tend to be syndicated. There is no degree in venture
capitalism, so venture capitalists have typically been successful managers
in many different parts of different industries prior to becoming venture
capitalists. This kind of a diverse knowledge base at the board of directors level is parallel to a strong external board of directors of a larger
company, although probably at a more focused operating level than a
large corporation. The chain of command impediments do not exist. It
is one man, one vote on the board. It is a very small operation. One can
act with dispatch, and one does. The important point is that there is an
appropriate corporate management support team for each different venture, rather than the same people responsible for the large corporation,
who can be expected to focus on things like market share and the business as it exists.
Since timing is of the essence, to conserve money and to get to the
market quickly and preferably first, ventures have to react very quickly.
We make sure that the decision-making process is rapid. Companies are
losing money, not making it, in the early stages. There are decisions
which must be made, but we do not have large agendas. Non-strategic
decisions must be made very quickly.
We have great freedom to provide incentives and rewards. Corporations are often hampered by the fact that there are established compensation packages, and no matter how extraordinary the efforts, it is difficult
to give one person a great reward and not upset everybody else. Innovators and the people they attract are capable of extraordinary effort, and
you must have the ability to reward that.
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As the venture progresses, venture capitalists have all possible exit
strategies more readily available than other support organizations. We
can take the venture public and make people wealthy and reward the
extraordinary efforts already provided. Merger or sale is far less complicated for a stand-alone entity than for a spin-off. Spinning off a piece of
an existing company brings several lawyers into rooms for many days
trying to figure out what exactly it is the company wants to sell, what it
can sell, what happens to the businesses that it has left behind, and so on
and so forth. It is a very difficult situation. In addition, we can cut
losses. We do not have public shareholders to worry about or Wall
Street to pacify. We can conduct private euthanasia - no flowers, close
family and friends only.
Venture capital is the business of nurturing innovation. The model
that we have come up with is based on the ability to evaluate opportunities purely on the basis of merit outside of strategic concerns or larger
corporate agendas. It is based on profit potential alone. We must have
the ability to accept and manage high degrees of risk. Failure four times
out of five is a record that the industry is proud to sustain. We have the
ability to become integral to the innovation process by sharing the vision
and hoping to realize it. Corporations and institutions provide immense
support for innovation, but there is still plenty to go around.

